Nothing is going to entirely circumvent wrongdoing. Edwin could probably write a paper on how to circumvent the proposed 'security' features for .uk (and quite possibly already has!).
I could, but I won't. Laying out an A) B) C) list of how to get around security features is probably a no-no, liability wise.
I've already explained the gaping flaws to Nominet's security team face to face at the Open House. Spent nearly an hour and a half doing so. At the end I got the same "That's interesting. We'll note your OPINION for consideration" as I did with any other comments I made during the 3 days of meetings.
Having said the above, in the broadest strokes I think the following is "safe" to say since none of the points will be "new" to any criminal:
- Real criminals will go to all sorts of measures to have their scams succeed
- There are MANY different ways to get something posted to "an address" either actioned or forwarded (possibly via several intermediate remailing services). It doesn't take a genius to think of half a dozen ways to accomplish this
- The major scams are done and dusted in hours. Any solution that works to a daily schedule or slower will do nothing to stop the DETERMINED criminal
- Criminals will be using stolen CC numbers and registering thousands of "burner" domains that they know will last minutes or hours. They don't care. Costs them literally NOTHING to register more.
- It is beyond trivial to validate something sent to an email address. It is also beyond trivial to chain together a string of email remailers completely free-of-charge (thanks to the thousands of free email providers out there) or to use one of the many one-time shot email addresses (dozens of companies offer "disposable email accounts")
- Nominet's "security" only proves that [x email address] and [y physical address] are capable of receiving at least a one-time communication from Nominet. NOTHING else is learned from the process.
At the same time, launching .uk WILL create more phishing opportunities, increase the probability of a phish succeeding, and lead to more misdirected emails (with privacy, security and business secrecy implications). This is implicit in the CONCEPT of .uk and its confusing similarity to .co.uk, and has nothing whatsoever to do with Nominet's specific proposal. Nor can anything Nominet suggests in an amended proposal mitigate these new risks - so long as .uk launches, they WILL occur.